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State Regulation of Nuclear Facility Hazards: A Case
of Federal Preemption
The current battle over nuclear power is being conducted in the
grand tradition of a medieval holy war.'
The United States needs to produce large quantities of economi-
cal energy while minimizing the pollution generated in energy pro-
duction and use. Clean, economical energy will not only promote a
high standard of living, but will also encourage optimum uses of
resources and make possible the disposal of waste within acceptable
aesthetic and environmental standards.
Nuclear energy is fast becoming a major source of electric power.'
It offers one of the best means for meeting large-scale electric power
needs in a safe, reliable, and economical manner with a minimal
adverse impact on our environment. However, the use of nuclear
power poses many uncertainties. Criticism has been directed toward
the hazards of a nuclear power program: the possibility of a cata-
strophic reactor accident,3 the long-term hazards of storing wastes
produced in the fission process,4 and the diversion of nuclear materi-
1. Rottenberg, Edison's Nuclear Gamble, CHICAGO MAG., Dec., 1976, at 152.
2. The Energy Research and Development Administration reported on June 30, 1975 that
in addition to the 53 licensed commercial reactors (accounting for 7.5 percent of all installed
electric generating capacity in the United States), 188 nuclear reactors were being built or
were planned. See ERDA, News Release No. 28 (July 25, 1975). It has been projected that
by the year 2000 there will be 1,000 nuclear plants in operation, generating 60 percent of the
electricity then in use. S. REP. No. 93-980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974). However, in light
of a recent spate of cancellations and postponements of utility orders for nuclear power plants,
these figures may be somewhat inflated. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1975, at 53, col. 7.
3. If there should be a very rapid rise in the power generated, or a blockage of coolant
from the core, the metals in the affected fuel elements might partially melt, and a rapid
energy-releasing chemical reaction could occur. Opponents of nuclear power assert that a
catastrophe would result and refer to a 1957 Atomic Energy Commission study (WASH-740).
That study projected that the effect of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) would release fission
products from the core into the atmosphere, and result in severe casualties to the surrounding
population. It should be noted that present day plants utilize a series of engineered safe-
guards, none of which were included in the WASH-740 hypothetical analysis. Proponents now
claim that the effects of potential chemical reaction3 have been anticipated and the plants
have been designed to absorb them with little or no release of radioactive material or other
adverse effects to the public. See Oversight Hearings on Nuclear Energy-Overview of Major
Issues, Congressional Hearings of Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, H. REP. No. 94-16, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1975).
4. The nuclear waste disposal problem is one of disposing of the wastes by ensuring that
they are isolated from human environment for the length of time it takes until they are at
natural background (harmless) levels-600 years to several hundred thousand years. Oppo-
nents question whether the technology to safely store these wastes even exist, and whether it
is right for our generation to leave a legacy of radioactive wastes as a hazard for future
generations. Proponents argue that it can be safely stored in a variety of manners. They also
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als by terrorist groups.'
Although the risks associated with nuclear power plants are calcu-
lated to be very small,6 there has been an ongoing attempt to limit
severely or actually prohibit the use of nuclear power as an energy
source. During 1975 and 1976 over twenty state legislatures consid-
ered bills designed to restrict or prohibit altogether the construction
and use of nuclear power plants to generate electric energy.' Initia-
tives against nuclear power were also proposed in eight states, six
of which placed the question of nuclear power plant development on
the ballot in the 1976 elections.
This opposition to nuclear energy was not confined to the state
legislatures. Proposals to curtail the development of nuclear power
have been made in Congress and challenges to the nuclear power
program have also been brought in the courts on environmental and
safety grounds.' But these state actions are unique in their premise
that state governments and not the federal government should make
the basic decisions about the development of nuclear power. Insofar
as the regulation of nuclear energy has always been an exclusively
federal concern, these state bills are at odds with the entire course
of nuclear development in the United States.
This article will evaluate state bills purporting to prohibit, re-
strict, or regulate commercial power reactors, and will examine their
argue that the problems nuclear wastes present must be viewed in light of the consequences
of using alternatives to nuclear power, i.e., depletion of other valuable resources. See
generally Puechl, The Nuclear Waste Problem in Perspective, in NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L,
Nov., 1975, at 950.
5. Opponents of nuclear energy argue that terrorists could conceivably steal or divert
enough nuclear material to make a bomb or disperse it in a manner to contaminate and kill
thousands of people. Proponents argue that security and safeguards now in existence make
theft and bomb-making or dispersal so difficult that it is not worth the risk. Because success-
ful bomb-making is made that difficult, they argue that it would be far less trouble to simply
acquire or make conventional chemical explosives, or biological poisons. See generally M.
WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFt: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS (1974).
6. See U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Acci-
dent Risks in U.S. Commercial Power Plants-Summary Report (Wash-1400) (Draft August
1974) in Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Status of Nuclear
Reactor Safety, Part II, Vol. II, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1030-63 (1974). This report concluded
that "the risks to the public from potential accidents in nuclear power plants are very small."
Id. at 1035.
7. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text.
8. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
9. The early opposition was based largely on environmental grounds (particularly heat
discharges from the plant). Recently, the opposition has centered on the risk of a serious
reactor accident, the problem of long-term waste storage, and the fear of diversion of nuclear
materials by terrorist groups. An incisive examination of the history of the nature and sources
of hostility to nuclear power and of the amalgamation of scientific and environmental opposi-
tion to commercial nuclear power reactors may be found in Palfrey, Energy and the Environ-
ment: The Special Case of Nuclear Power, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1974).
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constitutional validity in light of congressional authority to regulate
the field of nuclear energy.
HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER HAZARDS
Atomic power grew out of the wartime development of the atom
bomb. Initially, atomic energy was a highly secret activity con-
trolled by the federal government. 0 This control was reaffirmed by
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," which transferred full authority to
regulate atomic research and energy development to a federal
agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The federal govern-
ment retained ownership of all fissionable material and related fa-
cilities; private activity was restricted to contractual operations for
the government.
The Atomic Energy Act of 195412 ended the government monopoly
of atomic energy. Congress declared that the Act was intended to
encourage widespread participation of private industry and to foster
scientific and industrial progress in the development and use of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes."
The 1954 Act established an elaborate licensing system adminis-
tered by the AEC to control the possession of nuclear materials and
the construction or operation of nuclear facilities." The Act contem-
plated the rapid development of commercial nuclear power reactors
as a source of electric energy.'" Yet, it overlooked the question of who
possessed the statutory authority to regulate the production and use
of nuclear materials and facilities.'" An explicit role for the states
was provided,'7 but only relating to public utility regulation of elec-
10. See Miller, A Law is Passed-The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 799,
801-02 (1948).
11. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755.
12. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et
seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as the 1954 Act]. See generally MARKS & TROWBRIDGE, FRAME-
WORK FOR AToMIc INDUSTRY (1955).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1970). See S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1954).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(z),(cc) (1970).
15. The reports of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy noted that the major reason
for amending the 1946 Act to provide for the participation of private enterprise was to encour-
age the development of atomic power for the production of electricity. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954).
16. See Cavers, Legislative Readjustments in Federal and State Regulatory Powers Over
Atomic Energy, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 22, 27 (1958). Any parsing of the language of the 1954 Act
to find an indirect provision for state regulation is a futile exercise that can only produce
tenuous results because Congress never considered in 1954 the possibility of a state regulatory
role.
17. The 1954 Act provided for the issuance of licenses for the various materials and
facilities to persons defined to include states and their political subdivisions. It seems clear
that a state or a municipality could participate in the development of atomic energy as a
licensee of the Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(s) (1970).
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tric power.'"
The stimulus that the 1954 Act gave to private industry inevitably
aroused state interest both in encouraging the growth of this new
technology and in exercising the state's traditional police power to
protect the health and safety of the public from the hazards of
radiation. Many states acted to establish advisory or study commis-
sions on atomic energy matters and to provide for the registration
and regulation of radiation sources." While most of this state activ-
ity did not directly conflict with the AEC's superintendence of the
atomic energy field, there remained doubt as to the capability of the
states to regulate atomic energy matters. Commentators called for
congressional action to establish a carefully defined allocation of
regulatory responsibility between the federal and state govern-
ments.
20
In 1959, Congress responded to the pressure for clarifying federal
and state responsibilities by enacting section 274 of the Atomic
Energy Act.2' The amendment rejects any assumption of regulation
by the states by prohibiting state standards more restrictive than
those promulgated by the AEC. The purpose of section 274, as de-
clared by Congress, is:
(1) to recognize the interest of the states in the peaceful uses of
atomic energy;
(2) to clarify the responsibilities of the states and the Commis-
sion with respect to the regulation of by-product, source, and spe-
cial nuclear materials; and
(3) to promote cooperation between the federal and state govern-
ments and to establish procedures whereby the states would as-
sume specific AEC regulatory responsibilities. 2
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1970) provides in part:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations
of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or trans-
mission of electric power ....
The Senate and House reports of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy noted this section
"preserves the regulatory power of any appropriate agency with respect to the generation,
sale, or transmission of electric power." S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1954); H.R.
REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1954).
19. The status of state and local regulatory and developmental activities are well cata-
logued in Frampton, Radiation Exposure-The Need for a National Policy, 10 STAN. L. REV.
7, 29-40 (1957).
20. A bibliography of articles touching on federal and state cooperation in the regulation
of atomic energy is set forth in JOINT COMMrrTEE ON ATOMIc ENERGY, SELECTED MATERIALS
ON FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION IN THE ATOMIc ENERGY FIELD 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (Joint
Comm. Print 1959).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1970).
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Section 274 establishes a narrow role for state regulation. The
provision rests on the premise that prior to its enactment the AEC
exercised complete control over the field of atomic energy.2" It pro-
vides for the exercise of some state regulatory authority in limited
areas, but only pursuant to agreement with the Commission." Even
when such an agreement exists, state regulation must conform to
standards adopted by the Commission. The AEC retains the power
to terminate or suspend the agreement."5 Thus, states that enter
into agreements with the Commission are effectively agents of the
Commission in exercising its regulatory authority.
However, the amendment precludes state regulation in certain
areas where the Commission is required to retain authority and
responsibility. In these situations the states are given a consulting
role." Section 274 was intended by its drafters, the AEC, and the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to preclude concurrent state
and federal regulation. 8 In order to avoid dual regulation, the
amendment provided that the AEC can withdraw from certain spe-
cific areas of responsibility where radiation hazards are relatively
small and are within the regulatory capability of state government.
But the AEC retains full responsibility where technical safety con-
siderations are beyond the competence of the state government and
where interstate, national, or international considerations are para-
mount.2 9
23. This conclusion is thoroughly supported by the fact that § 274 repeatedly refers to the
discontinuance or continuance of the Commission's authority and at no point recognizes the
existence of any independent basis for state regulation of hazards for the protection of public
health and safety. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(4), (b), (c), (1) (1970).
24. Id. § 2021(b).
25. Id. § 2021(b), (g), (j).
26. Id. § 2021(c).
27. Id. § 2021(l).
28. Commissioner John S. Graham testified that the Commission had determined that it
would be "undersirable to provide for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction."
Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Federal-State Relationships in
the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 290 (1959). The Joint Committee stated that
§ 274 was
not intended to leave any room for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction
by States to control radiation hazards by regulating byproduct, source, or special
nuclear materials. The intent is to have the material regulated and licensed either
by the Commission, or by State and local government, but not by both.
S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959).
29. In the letter of transmittal accompanying the AEC's proposed bill of 1959, the Com-
mission commented:
The objectives of this proposed bill . ..are to provide procedures and criteria
whereby the Commission may turn over to individual States, as they become ready,
certain defined areas of regulatory jurisdiction. Certain areas, as to which inter-
state, national, or international considerations may be paramount, would be ex-
cluded. In addition, certain areas would be excluded because the technical safety
19771 Nuclear Facility Hazards
In addition to the 1954 Act and the 1959 amendment, several
other amendments also advert to state participation in the regula-
tion of atomic energy. The Price-Anderson Act, '0 the amendment of
section 271 of the 1954 Act,3" and the Energy Reorganization Act of
197432 all confirm the exclusive federal control over the radiological
aspects of nuclear power.
Under the current provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the regu-
lation of general radiation hazards is shared by the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC),3 3 other federal agencies,34 and state gov-
ernments." However, in contrast to the fragmentation of regulatory
responsibility over general radiation hazards, the regulation of pro-
duction and utilization facilities (in particular nuclear power reac-
tors) is exclusively within the domain of the NRC. The NRC's broad
regulatory and rulemaking authority allow it to fulfill its statutory
obligation to protect public health and safety in the licensing of
considerations are of such complexity that it is not likely that any State would be
prepared to deal with them during the foreseeable future.
105 Cong. Rec. 8383 (1959). The mandates of the AEC have been transferred. See note 32
infra.
30. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2210 (1970). This Act and its amendments provides for liability, insurance, and indemnity
against substantial radiation accidents should any occur:
In order to protect the public and to encourage the development of the atomic
energy industry . . . the United States may make funds available for a portion of
the damages suffered by the public from nuclear incidents, and may limit the
liability of those persons liable for such losses.
42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1970). See also S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
31. Act of August 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-135, 79 Stat. 551, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2018
(1970). The amendment overruled a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit which required the AEC to observe local ordinances respecting power lines to
the Stanford linear accelerator. Maun v. United States, 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965). The
amendment makes explicit Congress' intention that state and local regulation is only permit-
ted in regard to the rates and services of electric power produced in nuclear facilities and that
it does not extend to the protection of public health and safety from the special hazards
associated with them.
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5801 et. seq. (Supp. 1976); see Note, The Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974: More Power to the People?, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 410 (1976). This Act abolished the AEC
and transferred its development and research functions to the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration (ERDA), and its regulatory and licensing functions to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Act is significant because it specifically charges the
NRC with a number of regulatory responsibilities which are only implicit in the 1954 Act. As
a whole, the 1974 Act retains the goal of the development of nuclear energy and expands the
explicit regulatory functions of the NRC for the protection of the public health and safety.
33. Id.
34. The applicable regulations are those of the Department of Transportation, 49 C.F.R.
§§ 170-178 (1973), the Coast Guard, 46 C.F.R. § 146 (1974), the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, 14 C.F.R. § 103 (1975), and the Postal Service, 39 C.F.R. §§ 124, 125 (1975).
35. Under the Agreement States Program, 25 states have entered into agreement with the
AEC (now NRC) to regulate by-product, source, and special nuclear materials. See
U.S.A.E.C., 1974 ANN. REP. 192 (1975).
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nuclear power reactors."
The only qualifications imposed upon the exclusive authority of
the NRC to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear
power plants have been the results of recent environmental legisla-
tion. 7 Although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
the authority to establish general environmental standards for ra-
diation protection, both the EPA and NRC agree this authority is
limited to the establishment of ambient standards. The EPA's au-
thority does not extend to the restriction of discharges from individ-
ual licensed facilities." As a result, in addition to the public health
and safety questions considered under the Atomic Energy Act, the
NRC now considers a multitude of environmental factors when it
regulates the construction of nuclear power plants.
STATE PROPOSALS TO ASSUME NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITY
Notwithstanding the pervasive scope of federal authority to regu-
late the construction and operation of nuclear power plants and the
36. The Commission is authorized to
prescribe such regulations and orders as it may deem necessary ... to govern any
activity authorized pursuant to this chapter, including standards and restrictions
governing the design, location, and operation of facilities used in the conduct of
such activity, in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property.
42 U.S.C. § 2201(i)(3) (1970). The Supreme Court has held that this section gives the Com-
mission the authority to set forth by regulation "what the public safety requires as a prere-
quisite to the issuance of any license or permit under the Act." Power Reactor Development
Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 404
(1961).
37. The Environmental Protection Agency was established by an Executive Order in 1970
which transferred to it the functions of the AEC in establishing generally applicable environ-
mental standards for radiation protection. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-
1970 compilation) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 609 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
38. Pursuant to an AEC-EPA Memorandum of Understanding, it was agreed that the
EPA would have authority to set
limits on radiation exposure or levels, or concentrations or quantities of radioactive
materials, in the general environment outside the boundaries of locations under the
control of persons possessing or using radioactive material.
38 Fed. Reg. 24936 (1973). However, the agreement specifically excludes effluent limitations
on source, by-product, and special nuclear materials as subject to regulation by the Commis-
sion. 38 Fed. Reg. at 2680.
39. Prior to the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 et seq. (1970), the AEC took the position that in considering applications for construc-
tion permits and operating licenses it had to consider only the effects of radiation on the
environment and that it did not have to consider other environmental factors like thermal
pollution. E.g., New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Commission, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969). Under NEPA and pursuant to its interpretation by the court of
appeals in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the NRC has promulgated regulations which
require evaluation of the environmental effects of nuclear power plants at both the construc-
tion permit and operating license stage. 10 C.F.R. § 51 (1975).
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NRC's official position that the regulation of radiation hazards is its
exclusive province,4" some states have attempted to impose their
own regulations on nuclear power plant safety.4' These attempts
manifest concern over the environmental impact of nuclear power
plants and dissatisfaction with exclusive federal regulation. State
governments have proposed bills and referenda attempting to give
themselves authority over the development and use of nuclear reac-
tors. " For analysis, these bills can be categorized according to three
principal purposes:
(1) comprehensive regulation43 ranging from the legislative ap-
proval of the construction of any power reactor to the imposition
40. 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1975) (AEC General Counsel's interpretation of Commission jurisdic-
tion over nuclear materials and facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended).
41. In Northern California Association v. Public Utility Commission, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390
P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964), the California Supreme Court held that the federal
government had not preempted the question of the safety of the location of atomic reactors
and that the public utility commission could consider safety questions other than radiation
hazards raised by a proposal to locate a nuclear power plant in an earthquake fault zone. The
court made a very careful attempt to give broad scope to the concept of a "nonradiation"
hazard. In a subsequent application, the California Public Utility Commission read this
decision to give it some power at least to take note of radiation hazards. See In re Southern
California Edison Co., 54 P.U.R.3d 378, 385-386 (1964).
In New Jersey, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners has noted that the federal
government has preempted the regulation of nuclear reactors. However, it ruled that radia-
tion hazards could be considered in an application to construct and operate a nuclear power
plant because where the parties were in substantial agreement as to the safeguards necessary
to secure adequate protection against radiation hazards, it was unnecessary to define the
limits of federal preemption. In the Matter of Jersey Central Power and Light Co., 61
P.U.R.3d 395, 405 (1966).
42. The bills are on file with the NRC Office of International and State Programs, Be-
thesda, Maryland. This Office has published since early 1975 an occasional newsletter enti-
tled Information Report on State Legislation in which state bills and legislative action related
to nuclear energy are carefully summarized.
"Safe power" initiatives designed to place some measure of state control over nuclear power
were decisively defeated in all six of the states where they were on the ballot in the November
2, 1976 election. The states where the initiatives failed were Arizona (486,485 to 206,938),
Colorado (713,312 to 292,876), Montana (146,973 to 106,121), Ohio (2,397,780 to 1,130,818),
Oregon (563,995 to 410,720), and Washington (555,600 to 268,400). It is now estimated that
about one-fifth of the nation's voters have had the opportunity to vote on nuclear power. The
results have demonstrated that when the public is exposed to all sides of the nuclear energy
debate, their choice has been unanimously in favor of nuclear energy. See All Nuclear Initia-
tives Fail; Costs Proposal Wins, NUCLEAR NEWS, Dec., 1976, at 30-31.
43. Oregon is the only state that has adopted a statute that explicitly provides for compre-
hensive regulation of nuclear power plants. OR. REv. STAT. ch. 469, § 469.010 et. seq. (1975).
The 1975 Oregon Act gives extensive authority to regulate the construction and operation of
nuclear power reactors, other nuclear installations such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing
plants and radioactive waste disposal facilities, and the transportation of radioactive materi-
als to these facilities. Notwithstanding a provision in the Act for consideration of NRC rules
and regulations OR. REV. STAT. ch. 469, § 469.510(3) (1975), the Act clearly contemplates the
adoption of more stringent safety standards than those imposed by the NRC. OR. REV. STAT.
ch. 469, § 469.500 (1975).
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of specific restrictions on the location of nuclear facilities;
(2) moratoriums4 on the construction of nuclear power plants for
a specified or unspecified period of time;
(3) complete prohibition5 of the construction and operation of
power plants and the "derating" of existing operating plants.
It is clear from the legislative findings and the objectives of the
state measures that radiological safety is the focus of state interest."
These bills would give the state legislatures authority to condition
nuclear power plant operation upon compliance with various safety
standards. However, because the bills provide little guidance as to
ultimate standards, the broad legislative discretion poses a strong
disincentive to any utility company to construct a nuclear power
plant.
The proposed state bills threaten to interfere directly with the
development of nuclear energy and to conflict with the NRC's li-
censing and regulation functions. The complete prohibition initia-
tives go the furthest in this respect because they would halt all
nuclear fission plant construction and would require the eventual
decommissioning of existing plants. Bills incorporating
moratoriums would also terminate the construction of nuclear
power plants, and the comprehensive regulation provisions have the
potential to achieve the same result.
44. The effect of a moratorium would be the prohibition of any further construction of
nuclear plants for a fixed number of years or until certain safety precautions have been met.
The intent of such bills and referenda is to permit an intensive examination of the risks of
nuclear power, If at the completion of the moratorium it is determined that nuclear power is
an acceptable energy source meeting certain basic criteria, then construction would be al-
lowed to continue. These proposed moratoriums permit the continued operation of existing
nuclear power plants, recognizing the financial burden that would occur if they were com-
pletely shut down. Examples of these types of bills are: Washington House Bill No. 1154 (44th
Legislature, 1st Extraordinary Sess. 1975); Montana House Bill No. 433 (44th Legislature,
1st Regular Sess. 1975); Illinois House Bill No. 3426 (79th General Assembly, 1975-1976
Regular Sess.).
45. In the State of California, an initiative measure-The Nuclear Safeguards Initia-
tive-was voted on in the June 1976 elections. It would have required the progressive reduc-
tion ( "derating") of the operating power level of existing nuclear power plants to zero, and
would have prohibited the construction of such facilities until certain safety and liability
conditions were met. The initiative was rejected overwhelmingly by the California voters.
However, several bills similar to the California initiative measure have been introduced. See
California Assembly Bill No. 1579 (1975-1976 Regular Sess.); Massachusetts Senate Bill No.
456 (78th General Assembly, 1st Regular Sess. 1975).
46. Although the bills vary in detail, the common theme is a provision that the morato-
rium or prohibition take place unless one or more of the following conditions are met: (1)
nuclear power plants are demonstrated to be safe; (2) adequate provisions for disposal of
radioactive wastes; (3) security protection for plants and adequate safeguards against diver-
sion of nuclear materials are devised; and (4) waiver of the limits of liability imposed by the
Price-Anderson Act.
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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS
The state proposals to prohibit, delay, or regulate the develop-
ment and use of nuclear plants raise fundamental issues involving
the allocation of government power in the federal system. The Con-
stitution confers specific, enumerated powers upon the federal gov-
ernment, leaving broad, residual powers to the states.47 Where the
exercise of governmental powers by the federal government and a
state conflict, the initial inquiry is to determine whether the na-
tional government has acted within the scope of its authority. If it
has, a reference to the doctrine of federal preemption will normally
resolve the conflict.4" To determine the preemptive scope of federal
authority to regulate the field of nuclear energy, two issues must be
addressed: (1) whether Congress has constitutional authority to reg-
ulate the field of nuclear energy, and (2) whether Congress has
attempted to displace state activity in this area through preemptive
legislation.
Congressional Power to Regulate Nuclear Power Plants
When Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it based
its regulatory authority on its war powers,49 its power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce,50 its power to make "all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other property
belonging to the United States,"', and the need to protect the public
health and safety.5" Although the validity of some of these bases for
federal regulation is doubtful, there is little doubt that Congress'
constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce certainly af-
fords a legitimate ground for the regulation of the design, construc-
tion, and operation of nuclear power reactors.5 1 Congress determined
47. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
48. See notes 59-70 infra and accompanying text.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14.
50. Id. at cl. 3.
51. Id. at art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
52. In the Reports which accompanied the 1954 Act, the Joint Committee noted that:
[Tjhe legal basis of the proposed legislation is the constitutional powers of the
United States including, among others, to provide for the common defense; to raise
and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States; and to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States.
H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1954).
53. Congressional war powers and the power to provide for the general welfare also provide
some constitutional support for federal regulation of nuclear power plants. In the case of
Congress' war powers, it has been maintained that since the radiation exposure of the general
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that the processing and utilization of source, by-product, and spe-
cial nuclear material affects interstate commerce and must be regu-
lated in the national interest. 4 In addition, the Act provides Con-
gress that the "necessity for protection against possible interstate
damage occurring from the operation of facilities for the production
or utilization of source or special nuclear material places the opera-
tion of those facilities in interstate commerce for the purposes of this
chapter. '5.
Taken with Congress' intention to spur the development of at-
omic energy as a source of electric power, 5 these congressional find-
ings are an explicit statement of the direct relation of nuclear power
plants to interstate commerce. 7 Insofar as almost all nuclear power
stations produce electricity for a multistate power grid, there is a
rational basis for concluding that federal regulation of nuclear
power plants is within the scope of the commerce power."5 However,
population is a "vital factor in our whole national defense posture in the event of a nuclear
attack," Congress can exercise these powers to regulate the use of nuclear materials. See
Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private Atomic Energy
Activities, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 333, 350 (1954). However, reliance on the war power of Congress
as a basis for regulation suffers from tenuous logic. Moreover, Congress never clearly articu-
lated this rationale. Id., at 348-53.
Congress has asserted its power to promote the general welfare as a basis for the regulation
of nuclear power plants. In the original Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Congress provided that
"Iflunds of the United States may be provided for the development and use of atomic energy
under conditions which will provide for the common defense and security and promote the
public welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 2012(g) (1970). Although the spending power is a ready basis
for regulation of nuclear power plants, it does not provide a broad enough basis for the
complete controls which can be sustained under the commerce power. See Estep, supra at
353-55.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(c) (1970).
55. Id. § 2012(f).
56. See note 15 supra.
57. The use of the commerce power as a basis for the regulation of atomic energy was
carefully considered when Congress provided for private ownership of fissionable materials:
IT[he atomic energy industry is involved in interstate commerce-it has a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. Source materials flow from the mines
through the processing and enrichment plants to fuel fabricators and on to reactor
operators. The energy of the atom is then used to generate electricity which is
frequently transmitted across state lines. Spent fuels are then transferred to state
reprocessing facilities and the entire process may then be substantially repeated.
Furthermore, the radioactive nature of these materials itself may have a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce. The case of the improbable reactor accident
could have far-reaching effects extending across state boundaries and interfering
with arteries of commerce. The use of atomic energy is thus a legitimate objective
of the exercise of Congressional power under the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion.
H.R. REP. No. 1702, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964).
58. See Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power and Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
Even if a nuclear facility does not produce electricity for interstate commerce, the multistate
consequences of a potential reactor accident on interstate commerce provides a basis for
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the extent to which the exercise of this power supersedes state regu-
lation must still be considered.
Preemption Doctrine
The doctrine of federal preemption rests on the supremacy clause
of the Federal Constitution, which provides that the Constitution
and the laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of the
land.59 In its now classic formulation, the rule of decision established
by this doctrine is that where a state law stands as "an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of an act of Congress" 0 the federal statute prevails and the
state law is invalid. This simple principle of federal supremacy
masks the complexity inherent in the determination that the state
law constitutes an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objec-
tives.
1. Implied Preemption
Application of the doctrine of federal preemption most often
evolves from the failure of Congress to demarcate statutory limits.'
To reconcile the operation of state and federal statutes in the ab-
sence of explicit congressional guidance, the Supreme Court has
formulated a doctrine of "implied preemption."" The inference of
concluding that nuclear power plants affect interstate commerce. See Soper, The Constitu-
tional Framework of Environmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 24-25 (Dolgin &
Guilbert eds. 1974).
59. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. A determination that a statute is void for obstructing a
federal statute and is thus preempted rests on this clause. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S.
111, 120, 125 (1965).
60. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Court has noted its frequent adher-
ence to this articulation of the meaning of the supremecy clause. See Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
• 61. The fact that the Court has been forced to define the scope of preemption in the
absence of explicit congressional guidance was carefully noted by Justice Harlan in the
context of an extensive review of the Court's preemption decisions under the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970):
The principle of pre-emption that informs our general national labor law was born
of the Court's efforts, without the aid of explicit congressional guidance, to delimit
state and federal judicial authority over labor disputes in order to preclude, so far
as reasonably possible, conflict between the exertion of judicial and administrative
power in the attainment of the multifaceted policies underlying the federal scheme.
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 286 (1971).
62. Although the term "implied preemption" is an addition to the constitutional lexicon,
it is useful because it highlights the Court's role in formulating the doctrine of preemption.
The Court itself has recognized that in the absence of an express congressional declaration,
its task is to infer preemption. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 443 (1960); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767,
772 (1947).
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preemption can be drawn either from the existence of a conflict
between federal and state statutes or from congressional occupation
so complete in a particular field that it leaves no room for state
regulation. Although the general criteria of the doctrine are easily
stated, the application to particular cases has been inconsistent. 3
The Court has fluctuated with regard to the degree of conflict neces-
sary to support a finding of preemption 4 and has relied on various
presumptions to sustain an inference that Congress intended to oc-
cupy a field to the exclusion of state authority. 5 Several other fac-
tors make preemptive determinations complicated and indefinite.
The court must construe both the state statute and the federal
statute to determine precisely how they interrelate. For example,
the statute may directly conflict, tangentially interfere, or even
complement one another. Moreover, the Court has compounded
the difficulty of deriving any fixed standard of preemption by its
imprecise and inconsistent use of a broad range of descriptive
terms.,7 Finally, the Court has significantly changed its general
views of the appropriate bounds of federal and state authority, while
it has purported to apply consistent "tests" of preemption."s These
63. See Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515
[hereinafter cited as Hirsch].
64. The Court has not been able to draw a clear line between permissible and impermissi-
ble degrees of conflict. Compare Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) with Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
65. Examples of these presumptive indices include: the pervasiveness of the federal
scheme of regulation; the dominance of the national interest in a particular field of regulation;
and the possibility that the state law might produce a result inconsistent with the federal
statute. See Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
66. Hirsch, supra note 63 at 516-25.
67. The classic compilation of the various "tests" of preemption was made by the Hines
Court:
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal
laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflict-
ing; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; in-
consistency; violation; curtailment; and interference.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
68. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975). The author argues that a state-directed view of
preemption guided the Court in the 1930's and that a view of preemption favoring federal
interests dominated the 1950's and 1960's. He also suggests that a number of recent decisions
by the Burger Court presage a return to a view of preemption which favors state interests by
admitting a wider degree of conflict and by discounting some of the presumptive indices of
congressional intent to exclude state regulation. These decisions recognize that the Court has
held significantly different views on the essential nature of our federal system and has defined
the appropriate bounds of state and federal authority in accordance with those views. Thus,
the Court's shifting perspective on the essential nature of the federal system has distorted
any "neutral" application of preemption standards.
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factors have contributed to the vagueness of the rules for federal
supersession of state regulation. Fortunately, this confusion is lim-
ited to instances in which the Court, lacking congressional guid-
ance, must infer preemption from the existence of conflict or from
presumptive indices of congressional intent.
2. Express Preemption
In contrast to implied preemption, the scope of express preemp-
tion is more readily determined because Congress has specified the
precise extent to which state laws are superseded in order to achieve
the valid ends sought by the national legislature. Once Congress has
established the preemptive scope of a statute enacted within its
constitutional power, the Court relinquishes its role as the arbiter
of the federal system and defers to the congressional allocation of
governmental power. 9 However, an express preemption provision
does not foreclose all inquiry by a court into the scope of preemption
intended by Congress. Even when a statute contains an express
preemption provision, the court must still determine whether Con-
gress intended it to reach a particular state law. The judiciary must
accept this role, because even when Congresss does consider the
relationship of a federal statute to state laws it cannot consider all
possible state laws.7" That is, an express preemption provision can-
not establish a general preemption of all state laws. The court must
consider the legislative history of the statute and the congressional
purpose in enacting it in order to determine the preemptive scope
of the provision.
Although an express preemption provision does not automatically
supersede all state laws, a congressional declaration of the preemp-
tive effect of a federal statute does establish a more certain rule of
preemption than is available under the doctrine of implied preemp-
tion. When there is no congressional declaration, the court is free
to consider the degree of conflict and various presumptive factors
of intent to occupy the field-all in an effort to determine whether
Congress intended to preempt the field. An express preemption pro-
vision forecloses this inquiry and limits the Court's role to an evalu-
69. The Court's deference to congressional determinations of the scope of preemption is
also suggested by its careful search of legislative history. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island & P.R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966). On the allocation of respon-
sibility between the Court and Congress in establishing federal preemption policy, see
generally Hirsch, supra note 63, at 533-52. Congress always has the last word about preemp-
tion.
70. For a discussion of the Court's role in shaping preemption policy, see Hirsch, supra
note 63, at 542-49.
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ation of the federal statute's legislative history and congressional
purpose. Unlike implied preemption, express preemption provides
a higher degree of certainty in deciding whether Congress intended
to supersede a particular type of state law or regulation. Express
preemption also substantially limits the Court's role in determining
the allocation of government power in our federal system.
Preemption of State Regulation
Past efforts by states to regulate nuclear power plants provide a
means to project the outcome of proposed bills and initiatives. In
the leading case, Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,7' the
question was whether the State of Minnesota could impose require-
ments more stringent than those of the AEC on the level of radioac-
tive gaseous and liquid discharges from a nuclear power plant li-
censed by the AEC and operating in compliance with its federal
radiation requirements. The district court invalidated the Minne-
sota statute holding that section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act
expressly preempted state regulation of radioactive effluents.72 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed that
the federal government had the exclusive authority to regulate the
construction and operation of nuclear power plants.73 That authority
included the regulation of radioactive effluents.7" However, unlike
the district court, the court of appeals did not find express preemp-
tion. The court concluded that no provision in the Atomic Energy
Act expressly declared that the federal government has the exclu-
sive authority to regulate radiation emissions.75 Rather, the court
explored section 274 and its legislative history and found "an ines-
capable implication that the federal government possessed exclu-
sive authority absent the agreements authorized by the 1959 amend-
ment."" The court buttressed this conclusion with references to the
AEC's construction of the statute and to the pervasiveness of the
federal regulatory scheme, and reasoned that the nature of the sub-
ject matter justified uniform regulation.77
The court of appeal's reliance in Northern States Power Co. on
implied congressional intent prompted most courts and commenta-
71. 320 F.. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd per
curiam, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
72. 320 F. Supp. at 177.
73. 447 F.2d at 1154.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1147.
76. Id. at 1150.
77. Id. at 1152-53.
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tors to consider the question of preemption in the field of nuclear
energy in terms of implied preemption.7" Nevertheless, the district
court's finding of express preemption would appear to be the more
logical conclusion.
Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act constitutes an express con-
gressional declaration that radiation hazards arising from by-
product, source, and special nuclear materials are within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the NRC except to the extent that the Commis-
sion's authority may be relinquished to a state." This section also
provides that the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants is the exclusive responsibility of the NRC. 0 Accordingly,
section 274 has a broad preemptive scope over the regulation of
nuclear power reactors.
In most cases where Congress enacts an express preemption provi-
sion, there exists doubt as to its precise scope because Congress is
entering a field of preexisting state regulation. In such instances, it
is reasonable to assume that the intended preemptive effect of the
statute only reaches state laws similar to those which Congress de-
termined are superseded by the federal statute. A court may later
extend the preemptive reach of the federal statute to new state laws
where preemption is judged to be consistent with the legislative
history and purpose of the federal statute;8 ' or it may give a narrow
reading to the preemptive scope of the statute. In any event, the
78. See Helman, Pre-Emption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict Over Licensing Nu-
clear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 43 (1967); Estep and Adelman, State Control of Radia-
tion Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41 (1961); Engdahl,
State Power over Plowshare: The Constitutional Framework, 14 ATOMIC ENERGY L.J. 243
(1973). The courts have continued to apply the rationale of the Northern States Power Co.
decision. See Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 421 U.S. 998 (1976); New
Jersey, Dep't of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power and Light Co., 69 N.J.
102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d
266 (1976).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1970).
80. Id. § 2021(c).
81. An example of the an extension of the preemptive reach of a federal statute to new
state laws occurred in Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Ass'n, Inc. v. Clark, 482 F.2d 325
(5th Cir. 1973). In this case, involving local regulation of synthetic detergents subject to
federal regulation under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1970), the
court noted that where Congress attaches an express preemption clause to regulatory legisla-
tion thereby prohibiting any further action of a supplemental nature by the states,
"preemption applies even though there is no direct conflict between the federal law and the
state/local ordinance." 482 F.2d at 327.
82. An example of a narrow reading of the preemptive scope of a federal statute occurred
in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969). Two states had prohibited
the sale of automobiles equipped with auxiliary headlights, and the court had to determine
whether the state regulations were barred by an express preemption provision of the federal
statute which required that new automobiles be equipped with certain items of lighting
equipment which met certain performance standards. The court noted that congressional
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court has broad powers to define the scope of preemption when a
federal enactment overlays existing state legislation.
In contrast, where there is no preexisting state regulation, and
Congress envisions exclusive regulatory authority in a particular
field, judicial review is limited." The Atomic Energy Act was con-
ceived in the absence of preexisting state regulation. Congress also
intended to provide exclusive federal regulation over the construc-
tion and operation of nuclear power plants for purposes of control-
ling radiation hazards. Where Congress makes federal preemption
so explicit, a court should not engage in statutory construction to
redefine the preemptive scope of the federal law. 84
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearings on subsection
(k) of section 2745 support the proposition that Congress intended
exclusive federal control of radiation hazards attributable to nuclear
power plants. In August of 1959, during the consideration of amend-
ments to the original AEC bill, divergent interpretations emerged
regarding the effect of the proposals on federal preemption of state
atomic energy regulatory statutes. Because the debate was incon-
clusive, the AEC subsequently sent a letter to the Joint Committee
in which it expressed its position." The Commission stated that it
read section 274 to preempt state governments from the regulation
of radiation hazards from source, by-product, and special nuclear
materials, and that only an agreement between a state and the AEC
could remove this preemption. 7 The Joint Committee's approval of
purpose governed the question of preemptive effect and found that the purpose of promoting
highway safety overrode the goal of uniformity. Accordingly, since the basis of the state
regulations was the danger the auxiliary headlights posed to other drivers, and the federal
regulations were restricted to the effect of additional lamps on the required lighting equip-
ment, the court held that the state regulations were not preempted and in fact contributed
to the congressional purpose of promoting safety. In effect, the court limited the scope of
express preemption to the terms of the statute. 419 F.2d at 508-12.
83. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
84. Id.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1970).
86. Letter from A.R. Luedecke (General Manager, AEC) to Chairman Anderson of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (August 26, 1959) in Hearings Before the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy on Federal-State Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Hearings].
87. The letter states:
[W]e did not intend to leave any room for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction
by the States to control radiation hazards from those materials. Our sole purpose
was to leave room for the courts to determine the applicability of particular State
laws and regulations dealing with matters on the fringe of the preempted area in
the light of all the provisions and purposes of the Atomic Energy Act, rather than
in the light of a single sentence.
For example, in the absence of the sentence, the courts might have greater lati-
tude in sustaining certain types of zoning requirements which have purposes other
[Vol. 8
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the AEC's interpretation of section 274 rebuts any inference that
Congress did not intend to preempt the regulation of radiation haz-
ards.
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals in Northern
States Power Co. alluded to this strong evidence. Only the dissent-
ing judge in the court of appeals referred to this indication of con-
gressional intent." He argued that there was not "unmistakable
intent to preempt," relying heavily on the testimony during the 1959
hearings of an AEC official who was equivocal on the extent of
federal preemption of the regulation of nuclear reactors.89 This posi-
tion is untenable, however, in view of the subsequent position taken
by the AEC before the Joint Committee.
State bills affecting the development of nuclear power plants
must be evaluated in the context of this broad congressional decla-
ration. The typical state bill proposes to prohibit or delay the con-
struction of nuclear power plants in the interest of radiological
safety. The state would impose as prerequisites to the construction
or operation of these plants various conditions, including implemen-
tation of state-approved safety systems, provision for adequate dis-
posal of radioactive wastes, and full compensation to accident vic-
than control of radiation hazards, even though such requirements might have an
incidental effect upon the use of source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials
licensed by the Commission.
Id. at 500.
88. 447 F.2d at 1154-58.
89. During the course of the initial May 1959 hearings on proposed section 274, a repre-
sentative of the Office of the General Counsel of the AEC declined to state that the regulation
of nuclear reactors was expressly preempted by the federal government and suggested that
the precise extent of preemption should be left to the courts.
When Robert Lowenstein (Office of the General Counsel, AEC) was asked whether § 274
should contain a statement that authority to license reactors and control nuclear materials
was "expressly preempted to the Federal Government," Lowenstein replied that
[ulnder this bill which gives explicit reference to the interests of the Federal and
State Governments, we think it would be fairly apparent, as many of us now believe
under existing Atomic Energy Act, that there has been an area of preemption. We
considered the desirability of writing the kind of provision you suggest, Mr. Toll,
and we decided against it, primarily for the reason that it is practically impossible
to try to define, taking into account all of the various gray areas and special circum-
stances that might arise, where these areas of preemption should begin or end.
19.59 Hearings, supra note 86, at 307. In response to the suggestion that § 274 should be
reworded to state that the Commission shall have sole authority with respect to the reserved
areas instead of stating that "no agreement shall provide for the discontinuance of authority
by the commission" as to these areas, Lowenstein replied that:
We thought that this act without saying in so many words did make clear that there
is preemption here, but we have tried to avoid defining the precise extent of that
preemption, feeling that it is better to leave these kinds of detailed questions
perhaps up to the courts later to be resolved.
Id. at 308.
90. See notes 86-87 supra.
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tims.1' Insofar as these conditions all relate to radiation hazards of
nuclear facilities, section 274 of the 1954 Act would preempt any
statute containing them. A state safety measure imposing a prohibi-
tion or moratorium on the construction of nuclear plants because of
radiological hazards would also contravene the congressional policy
enunciated in section 274. This section of the Atomic Energy Act
demonstrates that Congress intended the regulation of radiation
hazards to remain in the exclusive domain of the federal govern-
ment. Thus, any regulatory action by the state in this field is su-
perseded .2
Apparently, the applicability of the doctrine of expressed preemp-
tion is not evident to some courts and commentators. However, the
conclusion that state bills are preempted under the doctrine of im-
plied preemption is inescapable. These state proposals are in irre-
concilable conflict with the federal policy in several respects. First,
it is settled that where a state law conflicts with an act of Congress
it is invalid under the supremacy clause . 3 Second, in view of the
congressional intent to occupy the field of nuclear power plant regu-
lation-an intent evinced by legislative history, the national inter-
est in this area, and the pervasive scheme of federal regula-
tion-state regulation is preempted even when the degree of conflict
falls short of direct interference.9 Thus, even under the rule of im-
91. See notes 3-5 supra.
92. The NRC has not taken a position on whether the state bills proposing a prohibition
or a moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants are preempted. The agency has
contented itself with a vague reference to the Northern States Power case. See 121 CONG. REC.
E3074-75 (daily ed. June 11, 1975); 121 CONG. REc. E3114-16 (daily ed. June 12, 1975).
93. In addition to the direct conflict posed by the prohibition and moratorium bills as a
whole, it should also be noted that each of the conditions considered individually is invalid
if it conflicts with the federal statute. For example, a requirement of full compensation for
damages resulting from a nuclear power plant accident is in flat contradiction to the limita-
tion on liability imposed by the Price-Anderson Act. See note 30 supra. Similarly, to the
extent that state regulation of nuclear power plant safety systems, disposal of reactor waste,
transportation of nuclear materials to and from plants, and security systems to guard against
sabotage conflict directly with the federal requirements, they are preempted.
94. The state bills which would impose a prohibition or a moratorium on the construction
of nuclear power plants would fall under the rationale of First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v.
FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946). In this decision, the Court held that the purpose of the Federal
Power Act was to promote the development of power resources and that the detailed federal
plan of regulation left no room or need for conflicting state controls. The proposed state bills
seriously disrupt the national plan and policy of Congress for the development of nuclear
energy to produce electric power for interstate commerce. It is not a sufficient answer to assert
that a state is free to prohibit the construction of nuclear power plants and to use other
methods of power generation so long as it provides for its own energy needs in a manner that
does not discriminate against other states. For, as the First Iowa Court noted, where Congress
has adopted a national plan to promote interstate commerce, decisions cannot be left to one
state but must be made by the federal government where the decision can be made on behalf
of the people of all the states. 328 U.S. at 182. If one state can withdraw from the national
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plied preemption, state regulation of the type contemplated in pro-
hibition and moratorium bills is superseded.
PERMISSIBLE AREAS OF STATE REGULATION
Although states may be federally excluded from regulating safety
aspects of nuclear power, they nonetheless have a valid interest in
nuclear energy development and hold an important role in its regu-
lation. There are two alternate means by which a state can effec-
tively regulate the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants: (1) by regulation for purposes other than protection against
radiation hazards, and (2) by obtaining or coercing concessions from
the utility proposing the construction of such a plant.
Regulation for Purposes Other than Protection Against Radiation
Hazards
Congress has declared that state and local agencies can regulate
AEC-licensed activities for "purposes other than protection against
radiation hazards."" Because state proposals have rested on con-
cern over radiological safety of nuclear plants," they provide little
guidance for determining the scope of permissible state regulation
for other purposes.
Nevertheless, one can discern some of these valid "other" pur-
poses. Zoning ordinances designed to exclude power plants from
areas not designed for industrial use would seem to meet the test. 7
plan to promote the development of nuclear energy, other states are free to follow suit;
therefore, in order to avoid total defeat of the valid congressional plan to promote commerce,
decisions about the construction and operation of nuclear power plants cannot be left to
individual states.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1970).
Subsection (k) provides that nothing in the new section 274 shall be construed
to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes
other than protection against radiation hazards. This subsection is intended to
make it clear that the bill does not impair the State authority to regulate activities
of AEC licensees for the manifold health, safety, and economic purposes other than
radiation protection. As indicated elsewhere, the Commission has exclusive author-
ity to regulate for protection against radiation hazards until such time as the State
enters into an agreement with the Commission to assume such responsibility.
S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959). This position is consistent with the AEC's
intention under § 274(k) to preserve state laws and regulations "on the fringe of the
preempted area" which might have an incidental effect on Commission-licensed activities.
See note 76 supra.
96. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
97. The AEC took the position in its testimony on § 274(k) that zoning regulations which
have purposes other than control of radiation hazards were not preempted. See note 87 supra.
For a view that the states can regulate the location of nuclear power reactors on the ground
of radiation safety, completely at odds with the analysis in this article, see Lemov, State and
Local Control Over the Location of Nuclear Reactors Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1008 (1964).
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Also, building codes deal with purposes unrelated to protection
against radiation hazards. For example, a code might specify stan-
dards for the construction of elevators or require a certain number
of sanitary facilities for plant employees. 8
However, some state regulations imposed for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards might well go beyond the range
of valid "other" purposes." Congress intended to preserve state laws
and regulations on the fringe of the preempted area, but some local
regulations might have more than an incidental effect on AEC-
licensed activities. For instance, the regulations of the NRC state
that nuclear power plants must be situated in an "exclusion area"'' 0
away from population centers and under the licensee's exclusive
control. A local government might exclude a nuclear plant from an
industrial zone where conventional power plants are permitted, sup-
porting this restriction with the rationale that nuclear reactors re-
quire larger sites. The governmental body's actual concerns might
be public anxiety over radiation hazards, as well as the higher as-
sessed value of the land and the greater number of jobs that would
accompany a more intense industrial development of the area.'' It
might be difficult under these circumstances to determine whether
the exclusion rested upon a permissible "other purpose." Also, this
species of local regulation might raise a sufficient degree of conflict
with the federal statute that it would be invalidated under the doc-
trine of implied preemption.'0 2
98. An example of such specifications affecting the construction and operation of nuclear
power plants occurred in Hanford, Washington, during the construction of an experimental
breeder reactor. The building plans did not include plans for a women's lavatory which
resulted in several weeks delay in construction of the facility. See also E. STASON, S. EsTEP,
W. PiERCE, AToMs AND THE LAw 1055-57 (1959).
99. A number of proposed bills include requirements for annual public review and disclo-
sure of the evacuation plans of a nuclear power plant. The purpose may be to arouse public
concern rather than to provide the public with information about orderly evacuation proce-
dures.
100. The regulations of the NRC require that nuclear power plants be sited in an
"exclusion area" where the licensee has excusive control and that the facility not be located
near population centers. 10 C.F.R. § 100 (1975).
101. See AToMs AND THE LAw, supra note 98, at 1065.
102. Even if a state regulation is for a purpose other than protection against radiation
hazards, it may still be invalid under the supremacy clause if it conflicts with the federal
statute. See note 60 supra. In a recent decision affirming the position that "the federal
government preempts state action concerning radiological but not non-radiological matters,"
the Michigan Court of Appeals suggested that a state court could require a nuclear power
plant to establish measures, within current technology, to abate a non-radiological nuisance.
However, the court added the important qualification that
[i]f such measures made the construction of a nuclear plant impossible, they could
not be required. In such a case, the federal interest would prevent state action from
absolutely prohibiting the construction of nuclear power plants within its bounda-
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The permissible scope of these non-radiological state regulations
become important when analyzing the regulation of public utilities
which use reactor-generated electrical power. State public utility
regulation was expressly contemplated by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954.' o0 Congress intended that the states should retain the au-
thority to regulate the rates and services of electric power produced
in nuclear power plants.' ° When Congress amended section 271 of
the act in 1965, it did so precisely to insure that state regulation
would be confined to rates and services.0 5 There is, however, no
clear line between state regulation of rates and services and the
regulation of radiation safety. The rates charged for electric power
and the level of service for nuclear power plants are affected by the
safety standards imposed on these facilities. If the NRC closes a
nuclear power plant or reduces its power output to correct a safety
problem, the level of service and rates charged to consumers will be
affected.'"'
The interrelationship of the safety of nuclear power plants with
the rates and services of electric power does not mean that a state
is free to use its public utility commission as a vehicle to effect a
prohibition or moratorium on the construction of nuclear power
plants. The fact that a public utility commission has jurisdiction
other rates and services cannot be used to justify a flat prohibition
of nuclear power plants on safety grounds. Where a public utility
commission purports to impose restrictions on the basis of the rates
and services of these facilities, questions of preemption become
complicated. For example, a public utility commission might forbid
ries. Short of such situation, state required abatement procedures would be legiti-
mate.
Marshall v. Consumers Power Company, 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1976).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1970).
104. See note 15 supra.
105. See note 28 supra.
106. In 1973 the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin granted two public utilities
authority to impose a temporary surcharge while a nuclear power plant suffering from fuel
densification problems was ordered to operate at less than full power, by the AEC. In his
concurring opinion to this decision, then Commissioner Cudahy noted the very close interplay
of economic concerns and safety. He pointed out that the AEC's order reducing the power
level of the nuclear reactor as a matter of safety forced the PSCW to allocate the higher costs
of electric utility service:
We note the inherent, but perhaps inescapable, difficulties of committing to one
agency (highly qualified in the premises) the exclusive jurisdiction over questions
of health and safety and predominate authority over questions of environmental
impact while committing to another agency of another government (ourselves)
jurisdiction over the economics of these plants.
Applications of Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Wisconsin Michigan Power Com-
pany, Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (Doc. Nos. 2-U-7608, 2-U-7609, May 15, 1973)
in 5 ATOM. EN. L. REP. (CCH) 16625.
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construction on the ground that the safety problems of nuclear
power plants lead to frequent, expensive shut-downs and in turn
provide a costly, inefficient level of service. Even if nuclear power
reactors and conventional power plants are determined to have com-
parable records of service,' 7 a state agency might still decide to
prohibit the construction of an additional nuclear facility on the
ground of diversification-that there should be an equal develop-
ment of a variety of power sources within the state.
There is no simple answer to the question of whether such state
public utility regulation would be preempted. The command of sec-
tion 274 of the 1954 Act-that the NRC have exclusive control over
the construction and operation of nuclear power plants-cannot be
reconciled in all cases with the authority of state and local govern-
ments to regulate the rates and services of electric power. Ulti-
mately, the validity of state public utility regulation will depend
upon whether its actual purpose is one other than a concern about
radiation hazards and upon the degree to which the state restriction
conflicts with the national plan for the development of nuclear en-
ergy.
Concessions by the Utilities
Since a company that proposes to operate a nuclear power plant
desires a good business environment and is exposed to many regula-
tions unrelated to radiation protection, there are many points at
which a state can apply pressure to regulate nuclear power plants.
As a result, companies are willing to "acquiesce" to more stringent
standards than those imposed by the federal government.
The State of Vermont successfully imposed regulations on a nu-
clear power plant in this manner. During the pendency of the
Northern States Power Co. litigation, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corporation signed an agreement with Vermont and several
conservation groups in which it agreed
(1) to submit voluntarily to regulation by the State Public
Service, Water Resources, and Health Boards,
(2) to abide by rules and regulations concerning radioactive
emissions notwithstanding federal preemption, and
107. A recent comparison of nuclear and fossil power plant operating experience found
that "the average availability of nuclear power plants in recent years has been nearly the
same as fossil plants of approximately the same size during the 12-year period 1960-1971."
U.S.A.E.C. (Office of Operations Evaluation), Evaluation of Nuclear Power Plant Availabil-
ity (Jan. 1974), reprinted in Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the
Status of Nuclear Reactor Safety, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Part II, Vol. 2, 1109, 1117 (1974).
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(3) to use its best efforts to secure AEC approval of the instal-
lation of any device that would restrict emmissions.1 s
Why Vermont Yankee signed this agreement is not readily appar-
ent. However, its contemporaneous efforts to secure the approval of
the Vermont Public Service Board for a bond issue suggest that
Vermont Yankee took this action to facilitate approval of the bond
issue.' 9 There may well be other instances in which a state has
successfully imposed restrictions on the construction and operation
of nuclear power plants."0 Vermont's success presents an alternative
to the state bills proposing similar regulations on nuclear power
plants that would be preempted under existing federal legislation.
CONCLUSION
This article has not addressed the wisdom of state regulation of
nuclear energy or the effectiveness of the federal atomic energy pro-
gram. Its concern has been with the validity under the federal sys-
tem of the various bills introduced in state legislatures to declare a
moratorium on the construction and operation of nuclear power
reactors within their states. Generally, the legislation seems invalid
as an intrusion into an area specifically preempted by the federal
government.
The supporters of these state proposals perceive dangers in the
generation of nuclear power and therefore have sought to frustrate
the development of nuclear plants. Having failed at the federal level
to retard nuclear proliferation, they have attempted to do so at the
state level. They have publicized their apprehension of the hazards
of nuclear power: the possibility of a catastrophic reactor accident,
the long-term hazards of storing wastes produced in the fission pro-
cess, and the possibility of diversion of nuclear materials by terrorist
groups. Yet, all of these matters are within an area of control ex-
pressly reserved to the federal government by the Atomic Energy
Act and subject to extensive regulation by the NRC.
In many instances, these proposed regulations would accomplish
de facto prohibition of the construction and operation of nuclear
108. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Office of International and State Pro-
grams of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Bethesda, Maryland.
109. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Vermont Public Service Board
(No. 3500, August 19, 1971), 91 P.U.R.3d 1 (1972).
110. U.S.A.E.C. 1974 ANN. REP. 192 (1975). It has been reported that at least thirteen of
the nonagreement states (see note 35 supra) regulate materials licensed by the Commission.
These states lack the authority under section 274 to regulate by-product, source, and special
nuclear materials, but apparently, neither the NRC nor any individual subject to the regula-
tions of a non-agreement state has been provoked to challenge these assertions of authority.
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power plants. Although the bills are phrased in terms of
"conditions" to be met before further construction may ensue, com-
pliance would be practically impossible. Moreover, apart from their
prohibitive effect, these measures would put the states into an area
in which they have less experience and expertise than the federal
government. Considering the preexisting federal regulation of the
field, state regulation would be duplicative and would probably
conflict with the federal program. Regardless, the state bills are
preempted by the Atomic Energy Act.
However, the states do possess a legitimate interest in the devel-
opment and regulation of nuclear energy. They will undoubtedly
have an opportunity to influence nuclear power development either
through informal pressure or through their state rights to regulate
areas other than reactor safety. One hopes that these forms of influ-
ence will be cooperative and supportive of national objectives. If the
states attempt to thwart federal policy, Congress would likely ex-
tend its preemptive reach and impose federal regulation on all as-
pects of the nuclear power field.
JOSEPH R. VOILAND
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